

After the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922, as part of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, a massive population exchange was undertaken between Turkey and Greece. 1.3 million Christians, approximately one tenth of Turkey's population, were expelled to Greece and 400,000 Muslims, almost one tenth of Greece's population, were expelled to Turkey. In Greece, the new arrivals, roughly one quarter of the post-war citizenry, dramatically changed the country's social fabric. In Turkey, although less numerous, the refugees were settled in western areas, where their legacy is still felt, overlaid with later arrivals of Balkan Muslims. The Greek-Turkish case is one of the largest instances of forced population movement in the 20th century, and one that permits analysis of long-term trends in electoral behavior and the impact of refugee movements on domestic party politics. Using provincial and regional electoral data from Turkey and Greece, this paper identifies and tests competing hypotheses of the long-term political behavior of internationally displaced populations.

Three fundamental hypotheses are formulated, discussed, and tested by the authors. "Nostalgic revanchism" predicts that due to the painful experience of forced migration, expellees are expected to be nationalistic and xenophobic, siding with right wing parties and movements in their new home countries, and possibly supporting militant international behavior towards the state that constituted their original homeland. "Outcast progressivism" purports that social marginalization towards the newcomers within the new host society will lead to skepticism towards the traditionalist right and support for left wing parties and movements. Expellees may also reinvent their cultural identity as 'go-betweens' and support a foreign policy of rapprochement with the country of origin. Finally, the "formative period" argument suggests that the displaced population's votes will be captured by whichever political party of the motherland-kin state was most supportive of their cause during the historical instance of their displacement. This party identification will be significantly maintained over time, trumping right-left divisions.

While the "outcast progressivism" hypothesis was the dominant paradigm in older Greek political historiography on the refugees/exchangees of 1924, "formative loyalism" hypothesis was and still is implicitly held in Turkish political historiography on the refugees/exchangees of 1924. Namely, in the dominant political historiographies of the two countries, Muslims of Greece were depicted as supporters of the Republican People's Party (CHP) in Turkish politics, whereas Anatolian Christians were depicted as staunch leftists, socialists or even Communists, in Greek politics. In stark contrast to these dominant narratives, our findings show that Muslims of Greece consistently voted against CHP in Turkey since the first free and fair elections in 1950 until at least the early 1990s, whereas "outcast progressivism" hypothesis in the Greek case was already seriously challenged in less than two decades after the population exchange when many Pontic Greeks shifted their allegiance to the royalist right wing parties. Among the three hypothesis entertained, for the Turkish case, only the "nostalgic revanchism" argument appears to carry some weight in light of the electoral data from the last six decades.

When we turn to their political preferences prior to the population exchange, Muslims of Greece were staunch opponents of Venizelos and the Venizelist parties he led and instead overwhelmingly voted for Royalist parties allied with King Constantine. Hence, deportation of Greek Muslims eliminated a significant opposition group to Venizelos and paved the way to decades of Venizelist rule in Greece. Similarly, Anatolian

Christians were opponents of the Committee of Union and Progress and its successor, Republican People's Party (CHP), and therefore their departure made it easier for the CHP to establish a one party dictatorship for almost three decades.

Put together, these findings demonstrate that the population exchange strengthened the political position of Eleftherios Venizelos in Greece and Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) in Turkey primarily by sending away voters who used to vote overwhelmingly for anti-Venizelist and anti-Kemalist/anti-Unionist parties, but not by bringing in new citizens who supported their political parties, which they did not.